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Abstract: DeRose famously argued that, given that assertability varies 
with practical context, we cannot combine a biconditional knowledge 
norm of assertion with classical invariantism. The first aim of this paper 
is to show that DeRose’s argument is ultimately unsuccessful. Second, I 
develop a view, entitled Assertion Functionalism, which combines the 
knowledge norm with classical invariantism and at the same time offers 
an appealing account of the intuitive variability of proper assertion.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Here are two attractive theses each of which, unsurprisingly, enjoy a great deal 
of popularity in recent epistemological literature: 
 
Classical Invariantism. The truth value of knowledge claims is insensitive to 
practical matters. 
 
And 
 
The Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA). One’s assertion is epistemically 
permissible if and only if one knows that p.1  
 
 Now, popular as each might be, surprisingly enough, those who want to 
embrace both Classical Invariantism and KNA2 are widely believed to face a 
dilemma. In a nutshell, here is how: intuitively, proper assertability varies with 
practical context in the sense that when the stakes are high more warrant is 
intuitively needed for one to be in a good enough epistemic position to assert 
than when the stakes are low. There are two ways to accommodate this 
variability. Either we allow for variability in what it takes to comply with the 
                                                
1 A defence of the KNA against the putative counterexamples in the literature is beyond the scope 
of this paper. The locus classicus for a case for the necessity direction of KNA is Williamson (2000). 
For a defence of the sufficiency direction, see Simion (2016a). 
2 The ambition of this paper is limited to discussing KNA taken as a distinctively epistemic norm. 
Insofar as one defends/attacks KNA as a different type of norm, the results in this paper are 
irrelevant. The vast majority of people in the debate are explicitly concerned with the epistemic 
norm of assertion. 
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norm of assertion but then we can’t have KNA. Or else we allow for variability 
in what it takes to know (or ‘know’) but then we can’t have Classical 
Invariantism. Hence, one out of Classical Invariantism and KNA has to go. 
Let’s call this The Shiftiness Dilemma.  
 Many, if not most3 contributors to the debate accept the Shiftiness 
Dilemma and grasp one of its two horns. The view that grasps the first horn of 
the dilemma allows for variability in what it takes to comply with the epistemic 
norm of assertion.4 In contrast, the view which goes for the second horn allow 
for variability in what it takes to know (‘know’).5  
 The central aim of this paper is to argue that The Shiftiness Dilemma is 
a false dilemma: KNA is perfectly compatible with Classical Invariantism. 
Furthermore, I offer independent reason to believe that if KNA and Classical 
Invariantism are true, variation in proper assertability is exactly what we may 
expect.  
 More precisely, the paper advances the debate in several important 
ways: (1) It identifies a widely assumed assumption concerning epistemic norm 
individuation (Content Individuation), which gets the shiftiness dilemma off the 
ground; (2) It argues that Content Individuation is false, and that therefore the 
norm at stake in the debate need not be epistemic; (3) Drawing on widely 
endorsed results in value theory, it puts forth a value-theoretically neutral way 
to individuate epistemic norms (Value Individuation). (4) It shows that Value 
Individuation delivers the result that the norm governing the assertion at stake 
                                                
3 Exceptions are few. Some people venture to escape the dilemma on speech-act theoretic grounds, 
by either denying that we are dealing with the same speech act in high stakes and low stakes cases 
(Turri 2010), or even by arguing there is no such thing as a speech act of assertion to begin with 
(Cappelen 2010). Also, several philosophers (e.g. Rysiew 2001) venture to explain the variability in 
proper assertibility in Gricean, pragmatic terms. This paper stays off speech-act theoretic 
controversies. It takes it that the speech act of assertion exists, is present in both high stakes and 
low stakes contextualist cases, and the intuitive variability is a normative rather than a speech-act 
theoretic affair. 
 Another notable exception is Tim Williamson (2005) who offers an error theoretic 
explanation for the intuition of variability. Roughly, the thought is that what explains the intuition 
is the fact that contextualist cases are borderline, and therefore non-luminous cases of knowledge. 
For a very compelling argument that the non-luminosity response will not work, since the 
contextualist argument can be easily reconstructed to feature clear cases of knowledge, see Brown 
(2008).  
4 This view comes in more than one variety; first there are people thinking that assertion is 
governed by one norm which stipulates that the appropriate amount of warrant for proper 
assertion varies with contextual features (e.g. Brown (2010), Gerken (2012), Goldberg (2015), 
McKinnon (2013), Rescorla (2009)). Another way to be a sensitivist about assertion is to stipulate 
several norms governing assertion depending on the context (e.g. Greenough (2011), Levin (2008), 
Stone (2007)). The differences between these views are, to a large extent, irrelevant for the 
argument made by this paper. Here is why: what this paper mainly concerns itself with is assessing 
the plausibility of the claim that the amount of warrant needed for epistemically proper assertion 
varies with practical context. As such, it dwells at a level of generality where the question as to 
whether the correct amount of warrant is set by one norm or many is irrelevant. 
5 Pragmatic encroachment (e.g. (Hawthorne 2004), (Fantl and McGrath 2009)) takes practical 
sensitivity to be a feature of knowledge itself, and thus the relevant stakes to be those associated 
with the subject of the knowledge claims. In contrast, contextualists (e.g. Cohen (1999), DeRose 
(2002)) argue that it pertains to language attribution, and thus it varies with the stakes of the 
attributor. 
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in contextualist cases is a prudential norm; (5) it proposes a functionalist 
normative picture for assertion that accommodates these results.   
 I will proceed as follows: I will first rehearse the case for the 
incompatibility for Classical Invariantism and KNA (#2).  Second, I will clear 
up some normative matters that have been generally ignored in the assertion 
debate, in order to show that, on pain of deontic equivocation, DeRose’s 
argument needs a further assumption to get of the ground – i.e., Content 
Individuation  (# 3). In Section #4 I will look at Content Individuation and 
argue that it fails. In Section #5, I will develop a functionalist account of the 
normativity of assertion that combines both KNA and Classical Invariantism 
(henceforth also Assertion Functionalism). In Section #6 I conclude. 
 
2. THE SHIFTINESS DILEMMA 
For starters, I’d like to take a closer look at The Shiftiness Dilemma. To begin 
with, consider the following cases:  
 
ASPIRIN-LOW. On the way to your place, your sister lets you know that 
she has a minor headache and asks you: ‘Do you have aspirin at home or 
should we stop at the pharmacy?’ You remember having bought aspirin 
last month and tell her: ‘Don’t worry, we have aspirin at home’.  
 
ASPIRIN-HIGH. On the way to your place, your sister’s lets you know 
that her two-year-old baby urgently needs an aspirin on doctor’s orders 
and asks you: ‘Do you have aspirin at home, or should we stop at the 
pharmacy?’ You remember having bought aspirin last month. Even so, 
you think it best to have your partner double check and so you call. When 
you find out that s/he is not at home you say to your sister: ‘Well, let’s 
drop by the pharmacy, just in case’.  
 
In ASPIRIN-LOW you assert that you have aspirin at home. What’s 
more, your assertion is intuitively entirely proper. In contrast, you are unwilling 
to do so in ASPIRIN-HIGH. And, crucially, had you to made the same 
assertion in here, intuitively, it wouldn’t have been proper. In this way, there is 
variation in the intuitive propriety of assertion (henceforth also Intuitive 
Shiftiness for short). 
Intuitive Shiftiness is said to give rise to The Shiftiness Dilemma. To 
see how, consider the following passages from DeRose:  
 
If the standards for when one is in a position to warrantedly [i.e. properly] 
assert that P are the same as those that constitute a truth condition for ‘I know 
that P,’ [as KNA would have it] then if the former vary with context, so do the 
latter. In short: [KNA] together with the context sensitivity of assertability […] 
yields contextualism about knowledge (2002,187).6 
 
                                                
6  Note that DeRose’s argument goes a bit too fast from KNA and the shiftiness data to 
contextualism; after all, any variety of pragmatic encroachment will share in the goods. 
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What of the advocate of [KNA] who does not accept contextualism? Such 
a character is in serious trouble. Given invariantism about knowledge, 
[KNA] is an untenable attempt to rest a madly swaying distinction upon a 
stubbornly fixed foundation. […] [KNA] demands a contextualist account 
of knowledge and is simply incredible without it (2002, 182). 
 
What DeRose claims here is that given Intuitive Shiftiness, if KNA is 
true, then so is contextualism. Of course, we now know that this argument is a 
bit too quick as another and closer look at the ASPIRIN cases will reveal. First, 
note that in ASPIRIN-LOW and HIGH you are in exactly the same epistemic 
position towards the proposition that you have aspirin at home: you remember 
having bought it last month. At the same time, your practical situation is 
different. In ASPIRIN-LOW not much hinges on whether you have aspirin at 
home. Your sister will be somewhat uncomfortable but she’ll not suffer any 
serious harm. In contrast, the stakes in ASPIRIN-HIGH are considerably higher 
than in ASPIRIN-LOW: your sister’s baby’s health depends on it. Since we 
may assume that everything else is equal between the two cases, there is reason 
to think that the difference in intuitive propriety between ASPIRIN-LOW and 
ASPIRIN-HIGH is due to the fact that the stakes are higher in the latter case. In 
other words, there is reason to think that proper assertability varies with stakes. 
But given that this is so, it is easy to see that Intuitive Shiftiness in 
conjunction with KNA does not entail contextualism. It won’t if we allow that 
whether or not one knows varies with stakes. And this is of course just what 
pragmatic encroachers have proposed.  
Even so, DeRose’s argument promises to establish at least the 
entailment between KNA and the falsity of Classical Invariantism. After all, 
according to Classical Invariantism whether or not one knows does not vary 
with stakes. Rather it depends only on one’s doxastic and epistemic position 
towards the target proposition and its truth value. For instance, in the ASPIRIN 
cases, either remembering having bought aspirin last month puts you in a good 
enough epistemic position to know that you have aspirin at home or it doesn’t. 
If it does, then you know in both ASPIRIN-LOW and HIGH (assuming that 
you have the corresponding true belief, that is). If, on the other hand, it doesn’t, 
then you know in neither. So, DeRose’s point about the impossibility of resting 
“a madly swaying distinction upon a stubbornly fixed foundation” would still 
appear to show that, given Intuitive Shiftiness, we cannot combine KNA with 
Classical Invariantism. In other words, DeRose does appear to establish at least 
the following:  
 
Conditional Incompatibility. If Intuitive Shiftiness is true, then KNA is 
incompatible with Classical Invariantism. 
 
Since we have already seen that there is excellent reason to think that Intuitive 
Shiftiness is true, we have equally good reason to think that KNA is indeed 
incompatible with Classical Invariantism. And that, of course, is all we need to 
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force The Shiftiness Dilemma on those who embrace both KNA and Classical 
Invariantism: they’ll have to give up one of the two.  
 
3. AGAINST CONDITIONAL INCOMPATIBILITY 
While Conditional Incompatibility may indeed seem plausible at first glance, I 
will now argue that it is false. To see why, I’d first like to introduce some 
relevant parts of normativity theory:  
 First, there are many types of action that are governed by a specific type 
of norm: chess moves are governed by norms of chess, driving by traffic norms 
etc. (henceforth I will use norm N as a shorthand for such a type-specific norm). 
Now, everyone agrees that assertion is a type of action and the epistemic norm 
governing it is just such a norm N.  
Second, all types of actions are governed by certain types of norm 
simply in virtue of being actions. For instance, all types of action are governed 
by prudential and moral norms. Crucially, a given action may be improper in 
one respect whilst being proper in another. When you move the bishop 
diagonally in chess, your move is proper by the norms of chess. However, if 
someone also threatens to kill you if you move the bishop diagonally, your so 
doing will be both practically and morally improper. And the same goes, 
mutatis mutandis, for asserting that 2+2=4 at gunpoint, say. Your assertion is 
proper in the sense that it satisfies KNA but both morally and practically 
improper. 
Third, actions can be assessed not only with respect to whether they are 
proper in the sense that they comply with the various specific norms governing 
them, but also whether they are all-things-considered proper. Crucially, it may 
be that even though a given action conforms to one particular norm, e.g. norm 
N, it is all-things-considered improper. This is just what happens in the above 
gunpoint cases: it is all-things-considered improper to move the bishop 
diagonally and to assert that 2+2=4 even though the relevant norms N are 
satisfied here. The reason for this is that requirements of moral and practical 
norms override the requirements of the norms of type N. What comes to light, 
then, is that many norms, including the epistemic norm of assertion are 
defeasible: they can be overridden by other norms.  
With these points in play, let’s return to Intuitive Shiftiness. Recall that 
DeRose argues from the intuitive variability in proper assertion to the 
incompatibility of KNA and Classical Invariantism. Crucially, however, I 
already mentioned that it is widely agreed that KNA is a norm N governing 
assertion. More specifically, it is a distinctively epistemic norm of assertion, 
that is, a norm that specifies conditions for epistemically proper assertion in 
particular. But now recall that norms N, including the epistemic norm of 
assertion, can be overridden by other norms.  
So suppose for a moment that our propriety intuitions in cases like the 
ASPIRIN cases do not track distinctively epistemic propriety but some other 
kind of propriety. Since it is entirely possible that an assertion is improper in 
some other way whilst being proper in the distinctively epistemic sense 
associated with the epistemic norm for action and vice versa, it simply does not 
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follow from Intuitive Shiftiness that KNA and Classical Invariantism are 
incompatible. By the same token, Conditional Incompatibility is false.  
What DeRose needs in order to establish the incompatibility of KNA 
and Classical Invariantism is that there is variability in the distinctively 
epistemic propriety of assertion (henceforth also Epistemic Shiftiness):  
 
Conditional Incompatibility*. If Epistemic Shiftiness is true, then KNA is 
incompatible with Classical Invariantism.  
 
Of course, Intuitive Shiftiness and Conditional Incompatibility* will not serve 
to establish the incompatibility between KNA and Classical Invariantism unless 
the following assumption holds: 
 
Epistemic Tracking. The intuitive variation in propriety of assertion tracks the 
distinctively epistemic propriety of assertions. 
 
Unfortunately, Epistemic Tracking is not all that easy to defend. To see this, 
consider the following question: given the fact that actions, including assertion, 
are governed by many norms the requirements of which may conflict in a given 
case,7 how are we to distinguish the requirements of the norm we are interested 
in – that is, the distinctively epistemic norm governing assertion – from the 
requirements of other norms governing it, especially when the requirements are 
in conflict? Note also that it is fairly plausible to think that, if anything, our 
intuitions track all-things-considered propriety, which may conflict with the 
requirements of pretty much any of the norms that govern the relevant action, 
certainly however any norm N. Given that this is so, however, the prospects of 
making a convincing case for Epistemic Tracking are dim. There is precious 
little reason to think that we can get to the condition for distinctively epistemic 
propriety simply by registering our intuitions about cases. 
By the same token, DeRose will need to do more in order to get the 
argument from Epistemic Shiftiness and Conditional Incompatibility* to the 
incompatibility of KNA and Classical Invariantism off the ground. Importantly, 
here the trouble is not with Conditional Incompatibility*, which I agree is 
perfectly fine. Rather the difficulty lies with making Epistemic Shiftiness 
plausible. What has transpired now is that there is little reason to think that 
merely appealing to our intuitions about when assertions are proper will do the 
trick as there is little reason to think that our intuitions track distinctively 
epistemic propriety here.   Rather, DeRose will need to supplement his 
methodology with a principled way to distinguish the requirements of the 
distinctively epistemic norm he is after and he needs to show that there is 
variation in just these requirements in the relevant cases. This will give him 
                                                
7 Jennifer Lackey expresses a similar worry regarding excuse maneuvers brought in defence of 
KNA: “For now, whenever evidence is adduced that concerns the epistemic authority requisite for 
proper assertion, it may bear on the norm of assertion or it may bear on these other […] norms. 
[…] [I]t will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to tell which is being defended (Lackey 2011, 
277).  
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Epistemic Shiftiness. And, since Conditional Incompatibility* is fine, it will 
enable him to establish the incompatibility of KNA and Classical Invariantism. 
 
4. EPISTEMIC NORMS AND NORMS WITH EPISTEMIC CONTENT 
Now, here is a view about individuating epistemic normative requirements that 
enjoys a considerable amount of popularity among epistemologists: 
 
Content Individuation. If a norm affects the amount of epistemic support 
needed for permissible φ-ing, then it is an epistemic norm.8 
 
 Note that if Content Individuation is a viable way of distinguishing 
between genuinely epistemic norms and norms of different sorts, Epistemic 
Shiftiness is true. If this isn’t immediately obvious, consider the following 
variation of ASPIRIN-HIGH: 
 
ASPIRIN-HIGH*. On the way to your place, your sister lets you know 
that her two years old baby urgently needs an aspirin on doctor’s orders 
and asks you: ‘Do you have aspirin at home, or should we go to the 
pharmacy?’ You remember having bought aspirin last month. Even so, 
you think it best to have your partner double check and so you call. When 
s/he confirms that there is a full pack in the medical box you say to your 
sister: ‘Don’t worry, we have aspirin at home’.  
 
Here, your assertion that you have aspirin at home is again intuitively entirely 
proper. Crucially, the only thing that differs between ASPIRIN-HIGH and 
HIGH* is that in the latter you have more epistemic support for your assertion 
than in the former: you not only remember having bought it a month ago, but 
you also have confirmation from your partner that it is there.  But then, of 
course, it is hard to deny that the reason why the very same assertion would 
have been improper in ASPIRIN-HIGH is that you do not have enough 
epistemic support for it. By Content Individuation, the norm that you are 
violating in ASPIRIN-HIGH is an epistemic norm and so concerns distinctively 
epistemic propriety. This gives us Epistemic Shiftiness. Since Conditional 
Incompatibility* is unexceptional, the incompatibility between KNA and 
Classical Invariantism will be established. 
                                                
8 One can find Content Individuation implicitly assumed in most of the literature on epistemic 
normativity of belief, assertion or action in the last decade (see e.g. Brown 2010, 555). 
Furthermore, Content Individuation is frequently explicitly endorsed as in the following passages: 
 
[T]he problem with the agents in the above cases is that it is not epistemically appropriate for 
them to flat-out assert that p […]. One reason this is clear is that the criticism of the agents 
concerns the grounds for their assertions  (Lackey 2013, 38).  
Assertions are governed by an alethic or an epistemic norm – that is, a norm that specifies that 
it is appropriate to assert something only if what is asserted is true, or justifiably believed, or 
certain or known (Maitra 2011, 277). 
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 The trouble with this line is that there is excellent reason to believe that 
Content Individuation is false, and therefore does not serve to support 
Epistemic Shiftiness. To see why, I’d like to return once again to the general 
theory of normativity. Consider, once more, a chess case. You are in a situation 
in which someone will kill you if you make any move. Here doing what is 
proper by norm N – say, moving the bishop diagonally – is all-things-
considered improper. Here overriding moral and practical norms render relevant 
action altogether improper in the sense that you shouldn’t play at all in the 
circumstances.  
Crucially, however, rendering the action altogether inappropriate is not 
the only way in which overriding norms can affect the all-things-considered 
status of particular action governed by it. To see this, consider traffic norms: 
suppose you are driving down a road for which the relevant traffic norm (norm 
N) prohibits driving faster than 50 km/h. Suppose next that a terrorist group 
placed a bomb in centre town and that you are the only person who is able to 
defuse it. In this case you clearly have a moral obligation to (do your best to) 
defuse the bomb. But now suppose that, in order to get there in time, you have 
to break the traffic norm and drive 90km/h. Clearly, the moral requirement does 
not render driving altogether improper. Rather, what happens is that the moral 
norm overrides the traffic norm and renders driving 90 km/h the all-things-
considered proper thing to do.  
 Notice that, in the two cases above, overriding norms affect the 
normative profile of the cases in two importantly different ways. First, in the 
chess case, overriding moral and practical norms render actions that are proper 
by norm N all-things-considered improper altogether. In contrast, in the 
driving case, overriding moral and practical norms modify the requirement for 
all-things-considered proper action: the bomb threat moves the all-things-
considered proper speed up to 90km/h. In sum, overriding norms can affect 
actions in both of the following two ways: 
 
Override1. They can render an action all-things-considered improper altogether. 
 
Override2. They can modify the requirements for all-things-considered 
propriety up or down. 
 
It may be worth noting that Override2 does not only concern the case of 
driving. On the contrary, similar examples can be construed for many types of 
action. What matters is that the norms in question regulate how much of a 
gradable property one’s action needs to enjoy in order to be proper. The case of 
driving is but one instance of this phenomenon. If this isn’t immediately 
obvious, just note that it can be morally and/or practically required to have a 
better or a worse grade average, to wear a longer or a shorter skirt, to speak 
louder or more quietly. These considerations suggest that, when a certain type 
of action is governed by a norm (e.g. a norm N) that requires a certain degree of 
a gradable property G, a norm overriding this norm can move the threshold for 
all-things-considered proper action up or down on the G spectrum.  
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Now here is the crucial point: when a certain type of action is governed 
by a norm (e.g. a norm N) that requires a certain degree of a gradable property 
G and an overriding norm modifies the threshold for all-things-considered 
proper action up or down, this does not turn the overriding norm into a norm of 
the type that it overrides. For instance, in the traffic case, when a moral norm 
modifies the requirements for all-things-considered proper driving up to 
90km/h, it does not follow that what we are now dealing with is a traffic norm 
that requires driving 90km/h. On the contrary, the traffic norm remains 
unaffected – it continues to require you to drive no faster than 50km/h – as does 
the fact that the norm requiring you to drive 90km/h is a moral norm. Rather 
what is going on here is that we are dealing with a moral norm that has traffic-
related content and the that the requirements for all-things-considered proper 
driving coincide with the moral norm.9 This means that there is a noteworthy 
difference between a norm of type X (e.g. a traffic norm) and a norm that has 
X-related content (e.g. a moral norm that tells you how fast you may drive). In 
particular, and most importantly for present purposes, the fact that a norm has 
X-related content does not imply that it is a norm of type X.  
 With these points in play, let’s return to the case of assertion. Recall that 
assertion is a type of action.10 According to KNA, epistemically proper 
assertion requires knowledge. Now, it is widely agreed that knowledge in turn 
is true belief such that one is in a good enough epistemic position towards the 
target proposition (henceforth also warranted true belief for short). And, 
according to Classical Invariantism, the threshold for warrant is of course fixed.  
Crucially, however, warrant is a gradable property: one can have more 
or less warrant for a given proposition. This means that, if KNA and Classical 
Invariantism are both true, assertion is a type of action that fits the normative 
profile of Override2. To repeat, KNA requires a certain (according to Classical 
Invariantism fixed) amount of a gradable property (i.e. warrant). We may thus 
expect overriding moral, practical, etc. norms to be able to modify the degree of 
warrant needed for all-things-considered proper assertion up or down. 
Moreover, here too, the fact that an overriding moral, practical, etc. norm so 
affects the degree of warrant required for all-things-considered action does not 
turn the norm into an epistemic norm. Rather, here too, what is going on is that 
overriding moral, practical, etc. norm has epistemic content and that the 
requirements for all-things-considered proper assertion coincide with the moral, 
practical, etc. norm. Here too, we find the difference between an epistemic 
                                                
9 Again, the other cases follow suit: Just because a norm regulates the appropriate color of one’s 
clothes for a funeral, it need not follow it is a fashion norm: it will likely regard social 
appropriateness.  It can be practically appropriate to speak louder or more quietly, no matter what 
the norms of etiquette require – if one is talking to someone who is hard of hearing, say. 
10 One legitimate question at this point is: where does this discussion leave the epistemic norm for 
action and/or practical reasoning? A full answer to this question falls outside the scope of this 
paper. I have argued elsewhere (Simion 2018) in quite some detail that, in virtue of the distinction 
between epistemic norms and mere norms with epistemic content, it is a mistake to lump together 
the epistemic propriety of practical reasoning with that of action. Practical reasoning is will be 
governed by genuine epistemic norms; action will not. For similar views, see Fantl& McGrath 
(2002). 
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norm (e.g. KNA) and a norm with epistemic content (e.g. a moral, practical, etc. 
norm that tells you how much warrant you need to assert properly). And, again 
most importantly for present purposes, here too, the fact that a norm has 
epistemic content does not imply that it is an epistemic norm. 11 By the same 
token, there is excellent reason to think that Content Individuation is false.  
 Now, recall that we are in the business of assessing the argument from 
Epistemic Shiftiness and Conditional Incompatibility* to the incompatibility of 
KNA and Classical Invariantism. We had already seen that there was little hope 
that Epistemic Shiftiness could receive the needed support from intuitions about 
the propriety of assertions in cases like the ASPIRIN cases. And while Content 
Individuation may at first glance appear to offer a more promising alternative, 
we have now seen that there is excellent reason to think that there is an 
important difference between epistemic norms and norms with epistemic 
content and, as a result, Content Individuation is mistaken also. As a result, it 
doesn’t serve to provide the needed support for Epistemic Shiftiness either.  
In sum, DeRose’s argument that KNA and Classical Invariantism are 
incompatible remains unsuccessful. The original argument from Intuitive 
Shiftiness and Conditional Incompatibility fails because Conditional 
Incompatibility is false. This problem can be fixed by replacing Conditional 
Incompatibility by the more plausible Conditional Incompatibility*. The trouble 
now is that the uncontentious Intuitive Shiftiness will not serve to establish the 
desired result in conjunction with Conditional Incompatibility*. Rather, what is 
needed is the stronger Epistemic Shiftiness. And we have now seen that there is 
no reason to think that Epistemic Shiftiness is true. Either way, the argument 
does not go through.  
 
5. A CLASSICAL INVARIANTIST REJOINDER: ASSERTION 
FUNCTIONALISM 
It is, of course, one thing to show that a certain argument for the incompatibility 
of KNA and Classical Invariantism fails and quite another to establish that the 
two theses are actually compatible. This section takes on this latter task by 
offering an attractive view that combines the two and accommodates Intuitive 
Shiftiness.  
 
5.1 Association Typing 
I will once again start by looking at some relevant issues in the general theory 
of normativity. Recall that we have distinguished between norms of type X and 
norms with X-related content. Most importantly for present purposes, there is a 
difference between epistemic norms and norms with epistemic content. We 
have seen that, as a result, Content Individuation is false. But, of course, even if 
                                                
11 Here is one natural worry that might arise at this point: Is the distinction concerning epistemic 
norms vs. norms with epistemic content merely terminological? What hinges on this distinction? 
Even if this paper is right, couldn’t we just continue using ‘epistemic norm’ as standing for ‘norm 
with epistemic content’? The answer is ‘no’; first and foremost, because this would get us in trouble 
when it comes to fit with the general normative landscape, if we do individuate other types of 
norms along different lines. This paper argues that we do. For more discussion, see (Simion 2018). 
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norms of type X are not individuated by whether they have X-related content, 
the question remains just how norms of type X are individuated.12  
 Fortunately, the theory of normativity has a widely accepted answer 
ready to hand:  
 
Value Individuation.  Norms are typed by the type of good they are associated 
with. 
 
For instance, prudential norms are associated with prudential goods, moral 
norms are associated with moral goods and so on.  
 Value Individuation is uncontroversial in value theory, in virtue of being 
value-theoretically neutral: it does not come with any substantive commitments 
about the relation between the axiological and the deontic. The association 
claim between norms and goals of the same type does not imply any direction 
of explanation. As a result, it is compatible with both of the two leading views 
about the relationship between the axiological and the deontic. The teleologist 
explains the ‘ought’ in terms of the ‘good’; he will say that the norm of type X 
is there to guide us in reaching the goal of type X. In contrast, the deontologist 
reverses the order of explanation: according to ‘Fitting Attitude’ accounts of 
value, the goal of type X is only valuable because the norm of type X gives us 
reasons to favour it. Crucially, in either case, the mere association claim at 
issue in Value Individuation holds.13 As such, for my purposes here, I will rely 
on Value Individuation without further defence.14 In what follows, I will only 
employ the teleological order of explanation, for the sake of simplicity. Nothing 
                                                
12 Note that the answer to this question just might still play into DeRose’s hands. It will of course 
do so if the correct way of individuating epistemic norms supports Epistemic Shiftiness. 
13 For a good general overview of the relevant literature in value theory, see, for instance, 
Schroeder (2012); for champions of the teleological direction of explanation, see e.g. Moore (1903), 
Portmore (2005). Sidwick (1907) and Slote (1989). For the deontological direction, see e.g. Scanlon 
(1998) Ewing (1947), Rabinowicz and Rönnow-Rasmussen (2004)). 
14 An anonymous referee for this journal voiced an interesting worry about VI: according to VI, in 
virtue of not being associated with any goods, ‘bad’ norms (for instance, bad social norms) will not 
be norms at all. I agree. On a first approximation, I believe that this suggests that VI needs to be 
restricted to foundational normative domains. In the case of foundational normative domains (i.e. 
moral, prudential, epistemic, which are the ones at stake in the relevant value-theoretic literature), 
VI holds as stated: if phi-ing is associated with moral bads, then phi-ing is not (prima facie) morally 
permissible, there is no moral norm asking one to phi. There are no bad moral norms. In contrast, 
in derivative, human-regulated domains (such as legal, social etc) there can be such things as bad 
norms, in virtue of the fact that we fail to be associated with any goods (although, likely, in most 
cases, the intention behind them is to track some moral or prudential goods).  
 Fortunately, for the purposes of this paper, all I need to import from value theory is the 
type association for foundational domains. As such, from here onwards, I will take this restriction 
as read. I take it to be eminently plausible that there are no bad epistemic norms, just as there are 
no bad moral norms.  
 One last issue: one might wonder whether, in the light of the point above, some of the 
examples I give, featuring derivative norms (I take it to be plausible that traffic norms, for instance, 
are meant to track prudential normativity) do not weaken the argument. It does not. The referee’s 
worry regards the necessity claim involved in VI. The sufficiency claim is still standing, and that is 
all the cases put forth exploit. 
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hinges on this: the argument can easily be re-construed in a deontologically-
friendly way.  
 Now, note that Value Individuation can offer an attractive account of 
the kinds of cases that caused trouble for Content Individuation. Consider, for 
instance, the driving case: the good associated with traffic norms is, 
presumably, the safe passage from one point to another. The norm that prohibits 
driving faster than 50km/h within city limits, for instance, is a traffic norm in 
virtue of being associated with this particular good. Moral norms, in contrast, 
are associated with the wellbeing of humans and other forms of life. With these 
points in play, let’s return to the case in which it is all-things-considered proper 
for you to drive 90km/h in order to defuse a bomb in time. What calls the shots 
here is clearly the wellbeing of humans and other forms of life, not the safe 
passage from one point to another. By Value Individuation, then, it is morally 
proper for you to drive 90km/h. The traffic norm still requires you to drive no 
faster than 50km/h. Moreover, in this case, the moral norm overrides the traffic 
norm with the result that the all-things-considered proper thing to do coincides 
with the morally proper thing to do.  What we get is just the analysis we were 
after. It is not as if the fact that the norm concerns the appropriate speed turns it 
into a traffic norm (as a generalized version of Content Individuation would 
have it). Rather, what happens is that we are dealing with a distinctively 
morally normative requirement, albeit one that, in this particular case, has 
traffic-related content.  
 Of course, Value Individuation also gives us a criterion for 
individuating distinctively epistemic norms. They are norms that are associated 
with distinctively epistemic goods. And it may be worth noting that, although 
many epistemologists have subscribed to Content Individuation, some have also 
embraced the value-theoretically more standard view. Peter Graham is one case 
in point: “Epistemic norms in this sense govern what we ought to say, do or 
think from an epistemic point of view, from the point of view of promoting true 
belief and avoiding error” (Graham 2012). Note also that Value Individuation 
makes plausible predictions about epistemic norms and norms with epistemic 
content. For instance, the norm that you may believe what is sufficiently 
supported by your evidence, is correctly characterized as an epistemic norm. 
After all, it is a norm that is associated with the epistemic good of promoting 
true belief and avoiding error. Consider, by way of contrast, the norm that 
requires you not to jump in the lake unless you know how to swim. Rather than 
being associated with distinctively epistemic goods, it is associated with the 
practical and/or moral good of survival. As a result, Value Individuation 
classifies it, again correctly, as a moral and/or practical norm, albeit one with 
epistemic content.15  
                                                
15 Note that the Value Individuation claim is perfectly compatible with a norm being of several 
types at the same time, insofar as either (1) it is associated with several goods of different types or 
(2) the good that it is associated with is central to more than one normative domain. For instance, 
plausibly, knowledge is both epistemically (for inquiry) and prudentially (for survival) good.  
 For the purposes of this paper, this is not problematic. If VI holds, the norm rendering 
the relevant assertion impermissible in the relevant cases is a prudential norm, i.e. associated with a 
prudential good.   Dialectically, the contextualist is in need of an epistemic normative constraint to 
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5.2 What Assertion is Good for 
In the light of the previous discussion about Value Individuation, the following 
question immediately arises: what is assertion good for (epistemically)? After 
all, if there is such a thing as an epistemic norm for assertion in the first place, it 
is likely there to insure that assertion delivers the epistemic goods we are using 
it for. Now, what epistemic goods is assertion meant to deliver? 
 Here is one plausible thought: assertions characteristically16 aim at 
generating testimonial knowledge in the audience. Plausibly enough, this is the 
main epistemic function17 of assertion.18 What’s more, it is hard to understate 
the epistemic significance of assertion. Due to our physical and cognitive 
limitations, a lot the knowledge we have is testimonial. Arguably, we learn 
most of the things we know about the world from our parents, our teachers, the 
media and so on. In this way, then, assertion is one of our key epistemic 
vehicles.19 This point is further reinforced by the fact that there is a sense in 
which knowledge is our way of being in cognitive contact with reality: in a 
                                                                                                                             
be at work in the bank-like cases for them to constitute data points against the classical invariantist. 
I take it, then, that, assuming VI, it rests on the shoulders of the contextualist now to argue that 
there is also a distinctively epistemic good associated with the norm here, which renders the norm 
genuinely epistemic too, by VI.  
16 Claiming that this is an essential aim of assertion would appear too strong. After all, I can, say, 
make assertions in a diary, which are usually not intended to affect any audience in any way. 
17For this paper, I do not need to go more into technical detail regarding the precise account of 
functions I have in mind, since it would crowd up the paper unnecessarily: any account thereof will 
do for present purposes. Also, I follow Peter Graham in using function, goal and aim talk 
interchangeably; for discussion, see Graham (2012). Nothing here hinges on this. 
18 For support of this claim, see e.g., Kelp (2014, Forthcoming), Reynolds (2002), Goldberg (2015), 
Turri (2016), Williamson (2000).  
 Contra the account employed here, Ruth Millikan (1984) and Peter Graham (2010) take 
the function of assertion to be generating true belief rather than knowledge in one’s audience. If 
they are right, one could wonder, would it not be reasonable to suppose that assertion is governed 
by a corresponding truth norm? I have argued in more detail in previous work (e.g. Simion 2018) 
that the function at stake is generating knowledge rather than true belief, so I will not rehearse the 
entire argument here. In a nutshell, the thought goes as follows: function ascriptions are value 
loaded: that they correspond to the (most) valuable contribution of the respective trait to the 
relevant system. The function of the heart is pumping blood in the circulatory system – not just 
pumping blood, since pumping it anywhere else would fail to be valuable for the organism; also, 
not just pumping something in the circulatory system, since pumping orange juice would also fail to 
do the work. On the other hand, pumping blood and making a beating sound does not seem to be 
in any way more valuable to the organism than merely pumping blood. Now, the way in which 
knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief (or any epistemic standing that falls short of 
knowledge, for that matter) has been a fairly hot topic of debate in the last years (see, e.g. 
(Pritchard 2010)). One thing is, however, assumed by most actors in the debate: knowledge is, as a 
matter of fact, more valuable than true belief; the challenge is to explain how, not to argue that it is. 
If that is the case, however, it looks as though, similarly to the case of the heart, value 
considerations give us reason to describe the function at stake as being generating knowledge 
rather than true belief. 
19 Is all knowledge on a par in this respect? Some items thereof seem entirely useless (e.g. about the 
number of blades of grass on my lawn). Perhaps it is more plausible to think that the epistemic 
function of assertion is generating interesting knowledge (see, e.g., Alston 2005 for discussion). For 
the purposes of this paper, I will take any such restriction on the relevant epistemic goal as read. 
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wide range of areas, knowledge is widely and readily available. For instance, all 
I have to do in order to come to know that there’s a computer in front of me is 
take a look; all I have to do in order to come to know whether I have a headache 
is introspect. In contrast, arriving at the corresponding true beliefs that fall short 
of knowledge is really quite a task (Kelp and Simion 2016).  
  Crucially, given all this, it makes sense to regulate assertion with a 
biconditional knowledge norm. To see why note first that we would want 
assertion to be both a reliable and a productive epistemic vehicle, especially in 
view of just how important assertion is as an epistemic vehicle for us. Second, 
on most if not all accounts of testimony in the literature,20 in nearly all cases,21 
speakers will put their hearers in a position to know what they are being told 
and so, assuming that hearers do their bit, will generate the corresponding 
knowledge in them if and only if they themselves know what they say. As a 
result, it makes sense to regulate assertion by a biconditional knowledge norm: 
abandoning the necessity direction in favor of a stronger rival may be expected 
to lead to a loss in productivity, while abandoning the sufficiency direction in 
favor of a weaker competitor may be expected to lead to a loss in reliability.  
 In sum, given that generating testimonial knowledge in hearers is the 
primary epistemic function of assertion and given that, on the vast majority of 
accounts of testimony out there, a speaker will do so if and only if he knows 
what he asserts, it makes sense to have a knowledge norm governing 
epistemically proper assertion. Let us call this account, deriving KNA from its 
epistemic function of generating knowledge in hearers Assertion 
Functionalism.22 
                                                
20 See Lackey (2008) for a nice overview. 
21 The following two types of case are the only exceptions I am aware of. The first are cases of 
‘selfless’ assertions in which the speaker asserts what is best supported by the evidence even though 
she does not belief what she asserts herself, for idiosyncratic reasons (Lackey 2007). These speakers 
assert to what is best supported by evidence, although they cannot get themselves to believe it due 
to some rationality failures. The second are cases in which speakers compulsively lie in a patterns 
manner but where this pattern is counteracted by a corresponding patterned unreliability in belief 
formation with the result that the speakers reliably assert truths (Lackey 2008). In both types of 
case, the speakers seem to be perfectly able to generate knowledge in their audiences, in spite of the 
fact that they themselves don’t know what they assert. While exceptions do exist, these cases are 
highly exceptional. As a result, I conjecture that they are statistically too insignificant to affect the 
above argument: weakening the norm of assertion to allow for these cases to come out permissible 
will incur greater overall losses in reliability and productivity than holding on the biconditional 
knowledge norm. 
22 An anonymous referee worried that the functionalist framework lacks the resources to explain 
the guiding character of the norm governing assertion. The functionalist normative framework is 
not, however, in virtue of being functionalist, restricted to generating norms without guiding 
potential. Whether functions generate norms that carry guiding potential depends on the entity that 
they regulate. When it is a biological trait that is at stake, likely, the generated norms will carry little 
guiding potential. Take the following normative claim: a properly functional heart is a beating heart; 
there is a biological norm that governs the activity of hearts in virtue of its function of pumping 
blood; its point is to make function fulfilment reliable. Of course, this norm will not ‘guide’ the 
heart in its behaviour in any way. Consider, in contrast: the function of the practice of shaking 
hands is social bonding. There are going to be proper and improper tokens of the type in the light 
of this: shaking someone’s hand too forcefully, for instance, it’s unlikely to be conducive to 
function fulfilment, which is why it will constitute an improper token of the type. That is, there will 
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 Before moving on, I’d like to make two quick observations. First, 
Assertion Functionalism motivates a distinctively epistemic norm of assertion. 
After all, the good that its key norm is associated with is the distinctively 
epistemic good of knowledge. In this way, Assertion Functionalism also 
delivers the desirable result that KNA is a distinctively epistemic norm.  
 Second, Assertion Functionalism is entirely compatible with Classical 
Invariantism. In fact, the above motivation of KNA in terms of Assertion 
Functionalism plausibly works best on Classical Invariantism. After all, 
according to that view, how good an epistemic position one needs to be in in 
order to count as knowledge is fixed. As a result, it is no mystery that one will 
generally generate knowledge in hearers if and only if one asserts what one 
knows. In contrast, given practical sensitivism about knowledge (or 
‘knowledge’), which allows for variation in whether one knows with stakes, it 
is not so clear that assertion should be as good of a vehicle for generating 
knowledge in hearers as we take it to be. After all, the relevant stakes on the 
side of the speaker might differ from the ones on the speaker’s side.23 Since I 
am of course mostly interested in a Classical Invariantist version of Assertion 
Functionalism, in what follows I will take ‘Assertion Functionalism’ to mean 
Classical Invariantist Assertion Functionalism.  
 
5.3 Back to Intuitive Shiftiness and the ASPIRIN cases 
With these points in play, let’s finally return to Intuitive Shiftiness and the 
ASPIRIN cases. In order to make a fully convincing case that KNA is indeed 
compatible with Classical Invariantism, we still need to show that there is a 
view that combines the two and accommodates Intuitive Shiftiness. I will 
illustrate how this can be done by taking another look at the ASPIRIN cases.  
 Before getting down to business, I’d like to flag that I will assume 
without further argument a version of Classical Invariantism according to 
which you know that you have aspirin at home in all the ASPIRIN cases. This 
means that we will have to explain why, in ASPIRIN-HIGH, your assertion that 
you do would be intuitively improper. Here is how. 
 First, your assertion would satisfy KNA and so, by the lights of 
Assertion Functionalism, would comply with the distinctive epistemic norm 
governing assertion. Note also that this is perfectly fine by Assertion 
Functionalist lights. After all, not only do you know what you would assert, by 
asserting what you know your hearer would come to know what you asserted as 
well, provided, that is, that she would do her bit also.  
 This means that the intuitive impropriety of your assertion must be 
explained in terms of some other, overriding norm. My suggestion is that it is 
practical norms that are at work here. Note that, once it is noted that the only 
                                                                                                                             
be a norm – generated by the corresponding function – that governs hand shaking, forbidding 
shakings that are too forceful. Note that this latter norm is able to guide agents engaged in the 
practice of hand shaking. Similarly, on the view defended here, the practice of assertion has the 
function of generating knowledge in hearers; in virtue of this function, proper assertion is 
knowledgeable assertion. Again, just like in the case of hand shaking, this norm is capable to guide 
agents engaged in the practice.  
23 See e.g. (Peet and Pitcovsky Forthcoming) for more discussion on this.  
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difference between ASPIRIN-LOW and HIGH is that the stakes go up, this 
makes a lot of sense. If the stakes change, the practical good that’s at issue 
changes also. In ASPIRIN-HIGH, the relevant good is your sister’s baby’s 
wellbeing, which now depends on whether you have aspirin at home. But if it is 
a distinctively practical good that gives rise to the higher degree of warrant 
needed for proper assertion, then, by Value Individuation, the relevant 
normative requirement is arguably a distinctively practical one also. What is 
going on in ASPIRIN-HIGH, then, is just an instance of Override2: the 
requirements of a practical norm override the requirements of KNA and drive 
the degree of warrant required for all-things-considered proper assertion up to a 
point that you simply don’t reach.24 That’s why asserting that you have aspirin 
at home would be all-things-considered improper. And that, in turn, explains 
our corresponding intuition.  
 In this way, even on a Classical Invariantist reading, Assertion 
Functionalism can not only accommodate Intuitive Shiftiness and the ASPIRIN 
cases, it can offer a particularly attractive account of it.  After all, this account 
of Intuitive Shiftiness and the ASPIRIN cases is but a plausible application to 
the epistemic case of relevant parts of standard normativity theory, to wit, 
Value Individuation and Override2. This completes my argument that the 
Shiftiness Dilemma is a false dilemma: contrary to what most contributors to 
the debate have taken for granted, it is entirely possible to embrace both KNA 
and Classical Invariantism. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
It is widely agreed that the variability of proper assertion with practical stakes 
makes it impossible to combine KNA and Classical Invariantism. Accordingly, 
it is widely agreed that those who are tempted by both face the Shiftiness 
Dilemma: if they want to hold on KNA, they’ll have to give up Classical 
Invariantism and vice versa. This paper has argued that this dilemma is a false 
dilemma. The key argument in support of it, due to DeRose, remains 
unsuccessful. The fact that there is intuitive variability in proper assertion does 
not entail the incompatibility between KNA and Classical Invariantism since 
what’s needed is variability in epistemic propriety and there is no good reason 
to think that our intutions track distinctively epistemic propriety. On the other 
hand, variability in epistemically proper assertion does entail the 
incompatibility between the two. But then there is no good reason to think that 
there really is variability in epistemically proper assertion. What’s more, I have 
developed a view, Assertion Functionalism, which combines KNA and 
Classical Invariantism and offers a viable account of the intuitive variability of 
proper assertion. In this way, the Shiftiness Dilemma is shown to be a false 
dilemma.  
                                                
24 Note that, importantly, extant pragmatic moves employed to dismiss contextualist cases have 
little in common with the view defended here, in that they concern the pragmatics of language. 
People like Jessica Brown (2006), Patrick Rysiew (2001) and Alan Hazlett (2009) argue that the 
assertion made in contextualist cases is impermissible due to triggering the false implicature that the 
speaker can eliminate all the practically relevant alternatives. In contrast, the pragmatic move made 
by this paper is at the level of the normativity governing the relevant speech act.  
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